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IN THE! s,UPREME COUR:T
,of the

STATE OF UTAH
REX HOLLAND,
REX HOLLAND, Administrator with
the Will Annexed of the Estate of
JOHN G. HOLLAND, Deceased,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
-vs.ARTHUR E. MORETON, ETHEL
T. MORETON, .also known as E. T.
1IORETON, JOHN R. MORETON,
also known as J. R. MORETON,
ROSE ANN P. l\10RETON, SUSAN
~IORETON TEVIS,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No. 87 40

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
(Numbers in parentheses refeT to pages of the
record. The parties vvill be referred to here as they
appeared in the trial court.)

HISTORY OF THE LITIGATION
This action was brought by Rex Holland individually
and as Administrator with the Will Annexed of the Estate of his father, John G. I-!olland, deceased, against
Arthur Moreton, a lawyer, and members of Moreton's
immediate family and ag.ainst five corporations. Before
the case came to trial the lower court denied a motion
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to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment filed by
the Moreton's (146), but granted a motion for summary
judgment filed by the corporate defendants (63, 64).
\Vhile that judgment was affirmed, Holland v. Colurnbia
Iron Mining Co., 4 Utah 2d 303, 293 P. 2d 700, this Court
specifically cautioned:
"But nothing herein contained should in any
respect be construed as a determination of any of
the issues as between the appellants and the individual defendants."
The evidence introduced in this case was substantially the same as the evidence considered by this Court
in the appe.al of the corporate defendants on the basis of
which evidence the following statement of facts was made
in the opinion of Justice Crockett (4 Utah 2d at 308):
"It appears that after conversations with
Mathesius, l\foreton contacted the Hollands at
Cedar City with respect to the patenting of the
1nining claiins in question 'vhich plaintiffs had
previously located ,,~ith a vie"~ to eventually arranging a sale; that he acted as their attorney
in doing so; that he advaneed the necessary costs
involved in the patenting and becan1e .a one-fourth
owner; that he aeted for his eo-o"rners in negotiating a sale of the elai1ns to Colun1bia; that
!foreton bore a fiduciary relationship to the Hollands and, therefore, o"~ed then1 a duty to make
a full disclosure of f.acts: that he seen1s to have
f ollovved a earefully studied plan to coneeal fron1
the Hollands that he "\Yas getting $287,000 for
his one-fourth interest, "~hereas, he "\Yas getting
for then1 only $33,333.33 for each of their onefourth interests; that Inean,Yhile he \Yarned the
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Hollands not to talk to anyone else about the
matter.
"The above facts appear from the Hollands'
testimony and are supported by other circumstances shown: that the l~etters (later referred to
herein) which Mathesius requested and which
Moreton presented to the Hollands for them to
sign, carefully avoided any recitation of the price
per ton or the actual purcha.se price being realized
from the claims; the fact that when Columbia
furnished papers handling it as one transaction,
Moreton returned them and requested two separate conveyances which would have the effect of
concealing from the Hollands the full consideration being paid; the fact that the two separate
conveyances were used and the transaction at
the closing was so managed that the plaintiffs
first received their check for $100,000 about which
they quite naturally would be somewhat elated
and preoccupied while the Moreton phase of the
transaction was handled."
This case went to trial against the individual defendants before the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson and
a jury. At the close of all the evidence the court directed
a verdict against both plaintiffs, in favor of all the
individual defendants except Arthur E. Moreton and
against the administrator and in favor of defendant Moreton (288, 289). The trial court then submitted the cause
of action of Rex Holland in his individual capacity
against l\1:oreton to the jury. The jury found in favor
of Rex and awarded him general damages in the sum of
$95,833 and punitive damages in the sum of $25,000
(277). Thereafter the court set aside the verdict and
granted defendants' motion for a directed verdict with
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respect to the cause of action of Rex Holland in his
individual capacity and entere,d a judgment for defendant Moreton notwithstanding the verdict (292-294).

NATURE OF THE APPEAL
This is an appeal from the judgment entered in
favor of the defendant ~Ioreton and again.st the plaintiff
Rex Holland in his individual capacity, after the jury
had rendered judgment in Rex's favor in the sum of
$95,833 general damages and $25,000 punitive damages,
from the judgment on the directed verdict entered in
favor of the defendant )Ioreton and against the plaintiff Rex Holland as Administrator with the Will Annexed of the Estate of John G. Holland, deceased and
from the judgment on the directed verdict in favor of
the other defendants and against both plaintiffs (304,
305).
The plain tiff, Rex Holland, in his individual capacity, asks the Court to set aside the judgment entered
against hi1n not\Yithstanding the verdict and to reinstate the judg1nent in his fayor against ~Ioreton in the
su1n of $120,833.00 and to add thereto interest on $95,833
at the rate of 6% per annun1 fron1 the 20th day of Deeeinber 1948. IIe further asks the court to set aside the
,iudg1nent on the directed yerdict entered ,against hin1 and
in favor of the defendants other than :Jioreton and to
entPr judgn1ent in his fayor against the such defendants
in a like an1ount or, in the alternatiye~ to grant a new
trial against such defendants.
The plaintiff Rex I-Iolland as ...:-\_dininistrator w·ith
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the Will Annexed of the Estate of John G. Holland,
Deceased, asks this Court to reverse the· judgn1ent entered on the directed verdict in favor of all defendants
and to enter judgment in his favor and against the
defendants in the amount rendered against l\1oreton or
in the alternative to gr.ant the administrator a new trial.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Rex Holland and John I-Iolland, his father, and one
1\furie owned three mining clai1ns. The defendant :Th!Ioreton, an attorney at law, duly licensed to practice law in
the State of Utah, fraudulently obtained a one-fourth
interest in said mining claims. Thereafter, acting as their
attorney, he negotiated a sale of the property. He fraudulently concealed from the co-owners that the total sale
price of the property was $387,500.00 .and he fraudulently
concealed from the co-ovvners the fact that he hin1self
received $287,500.00 for the one-fourth interest that he
had fraudulently obtained from the co-owners while each
of his clients received but $33,333.33 for an undivided
one-fourth intere.st.
This is an action for damages against the Moretons
resulting from attorney Moreton's breach of his confidential relationship with his clients, the Hollands and
I\1urie, by fraudulently misrepresenting the value of the
property, by concealing from then1 the total price received for the entire property and the amount he received for his purported one fourth interest in the property and for otherwise overreaching and taking advantage of his clients from the very beginning.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The three prospectors, Rex Holland, his father, John
Holland (now deeeased), and William C. Murie, jointly
located the three mining claims known as the M & H
Claims in 1941 and 1943 (Ex. P-1, P-2 and P-3). These
men were of trusting disposition and entirely lacking
in business experience. The transaction involved herein
was the only sale of mining property with which they
had ever been connected (526). They not only had no
idea of what the value of their property was but, additionally they had no way of determining its value (669).
(a)

Attorney Moreton in the spring of 1946 went to
Cedar City and made arrangements to see the co-owners
at the Escalante Hotel (331, 332). The inference is that
he knew a great deal about the potential value of the
claims which the co-owners did not know and he sent
for them.
At this first meeting he proposed an arrangement
'vhich was accepted by the1n, ''Thereby he \Yas to be their
attorney in the proceedings to get a p.atent on their property and in the sale of their property, and \Yhereby he
w.as to have an option to patent the property in ·w-hich
event he was to receiYe a quarter interest in their property and also an option to purchase the re1naining threefourths interest of the property (333). The agreen1ent
was reduced to \Yriting by attorney ~Ioreton and signed
by the co-o,vners ( 333, 334). They \Yere neyer given a
copy of it and Moreton has never produced a copy of
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it. His claim is that the document has been lost (335,
612, 615 ).
Plaintiff Rex Holland testified as to this first option
that no time was fixed for its exercise and that no price
was fixed but that both were left blank in the writing
prepared by l\{oreton and signed by Rex, his father and
l\1urie (333, 336). While the defendant Moreton's testimony attempts to contradict this ( 623, 627), the matter
that is uncontradicted is this: attorney Moreton gave no
adequate consideration for the option he secured on the
property ultimately sold for $387,500.00. J\tforeton testified that the writing, of which he had the only copy and
vvhich he did not produce ( 615), recited a consideration
of $1.00, but his attorney objected to a question as to
'vhether or not even that $1.00 was paid ( 626).
At this first meeting l\!Ioreton instructed the coowners, as he did on every other occasion, not to discuss
the sale of the property with anyone (445).
On J-uly 5, 1946, Moreton wrote the co-owners again
jnstructing them not to discuss the sale of the property
'vith anyone ( 644). His reason, as announced at the
trial, for giving this instruction, was that it was necessary to protect him ( 645).
(b)

On September 1, 1946, Moreton who had done absolutely nothing at all towards getting the claims patented
(627, 628), came to Cedar City auu on his ple1a that
he needed more time· (629, 651), had the· option extended to April 1, 1947 (Ex. P -4). Again, he gave then1
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no consideration for this extension and gave them no
copies of the paper he prepared and had them sign (339,
340, 657).
Moreton next went to Cedar City on or about March
10, 1947, and he still had done nothing at all in connection
with patenting the clai1ns except to talk to a surveyor
(343, 663) but this time he had his clients sign a letter he
had previously prepared (341, 345) (Ex. P-8) under
the terms of which he was to receive a deed to a onefourth intere.st in the property inzmediately upon his
1nerely filing an application for a patent survey. This,
again, was presented by him ·without an~ consideration
and represented .a drastic change from the original agreement that provided he "\Vas to get the one-fourth interest
only \Yhen he actually patented the property.
It was at this )larch meeting that :Jioreton told the
co-o\vners that there "\Yere 1,500,000 tons of ore on the
property (343) but that because of the overburden "we
could not expect to get n1ore than 10 cents a ton" (3-±±).
l\I ore ton said, further1nore, that they eould probably get
$13~,000.00 .as an over-all price and of this amount the
co-o\\Tners \\Tould get $100,000.00, leaving $33,000.00 for
their la''T~Ter, defendant !Ioreton (344).
Additionall~~,

it appears, that ~foreton "\vas careful
on this and frequent other occasions to point out that
it n1ight be pos8ible to get so1nething 1uore than $133,000,
pP rhap~ as 1nuch as $133,000. ,,. . hile his clients agreed
that- he eould keep \Yha teYer there n1ight be oYer $133,000,
it is er)Tstal clear on the record that this \vas on their
lH~lief induePd by his representations that the price could
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never 1n any event be more than $155,000.00 ,and the
overage never more than $22,000 ( 445, 527, 529, 530,
542, 543).
(c)

On or about June, 1947, l\1oreton who still had not
secured a patent on the property and whose options to
purchase a three-fourths interest for $100,000.00 had
expired all unexercised, next prepared another document
for his clients (Ex. P -5). This one gave him an option
to purchase the three-fourths interest for $100,000.00,
payable either in cash or in ten annual payments, without anything for interest. 1foreton testified as to th1s
option which was for a twelve month period that he
"overlooked" putting a date on it when he prepared it
at his office (677, 678) and further, that this new undated
option represented "quite a little difference in the original proposal" between him and his clients for which
he was prepared to pay more money than $100,000.00.
He, of course, never advised his clients of this ( 679)
vvhen he procured their signatures to the option which
he admitted he never exercised ( 352, 682).
In July of 1947 Moreton prepared and procured the
signatures of the co-owners to .a so-called Agreement
of Ownership (360-361, 688) to take the place of the
prior undated option ( 360, Exhibit D-33). This agreement of owner.ship recited that Moreton was to have
a one-fourth interest in the property and all over $100,000 if "said property shall be sold, leased or otherwise
disposed of on a tonnage basis for .a sum in excess of
$133,333.33." Additionally and as also provided in the
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agreement of ownership, he had his clients give him
on July 23, 1947, a warranty deed for a one-fourth
interest ( 691, 692, Exhibit P -6). Moreton confessed at
the trial that in view of the fact that he had not secured
a patent on the property he had not earned that onefourth interest (701, 702) and that the agreement of
ownership rep·resented a considerable deviation from the
option in that under the agreement of ownership he was
not required to put up $100,000 or get anyone else to
put up $100,000, and that further, there was no time
limit in the agreement of ownership as to \Yhen anything
had to be done (698).
From his own testimony it is clear he never advised
his clients of the significance of any of the documents
they signed and (except for purported tax considerations
which clearly appear to have been an afterthought) the
only reason he gave at the trial for having them sign
the documents of July 23, 1947, was that he "preferred
to have it that way to evidence 1ny ozc1wrship as a matter
of record" ( 695). In any event, the property w.as neither
sold, lea:sed or other,Yise disposed of on a tonnage basis
so as to fall 'vithin the tern1s of the agreement of o\vnership.
l[oreton next prepared and filed the application for
patent August 25, 1947 (Ex. P-1:2). He also prepared
the other papers necessary to be signed by the co-owners
(Ex. P-13).
(d)
On September 14, 1948, R.ex Holland had a chance
tneeting with one Parley Canfield on the street (381).
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Canfield, who had been a total stranger to Rex ( 368),
n1entioned that there were 3,500,000 tons of ore in the
l\t1 & H claims and iron ore had been bringing 25 cents
a ton (381, 382). Since Moreton had told them there
were only 1,500,000 tons of ore in the M & H and the
price was only 10 cents a ton, Rex didn't knovv what to
think (446), so that night he wrote this letter (Ex. P-14)
to Dr. Walther Mathe.sius, President of Columbia, hoping
that Mathesius would advise him.
Mathesius took the letter to Attorney Moreton and
discussed it with him (717, 786), but neither of them
answered it or ever at any time mentioned it to Rex or
the other co-owners (438-439, 526-527).
In the meantime Canfield admitted to Rex that he
had been mistaken .as to the tonnage contained in the
~I & H claims (383) and that he had been talking about
son1ebody else's claims (382, 383). Rex had been told
by Moreton that while some iron ore would bring 25
cents a ton, the iron ore in the 1f & H claims could only
bring about 10 cents a ton because of the size of the
overburden ( 344). Rex concluded that since Canfield
had been entirely "\Vrong .as to the amount of tonnage,
that therefore Canfield's price information was not applicable to the M & H claims and that Moreton had advised
the co-owners correctly on the tonnage and the price
(385). Rex's confidence in Moreton was now restored
(527). I-Iis belief in everything that Moreton had said in
the past w.as confirmed and he believed everything that
Moreton said thereafter ( 540). For that reason Rex
never asked ~1oreton how much he (Moreton) was get-
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ting for his (Moreton's) one-fourtl1 interest or how much
was being obtained for the entire property (527, 528).
(e)

The record establishes that Moreton was dealing with
Mathesius before April of 1946 (831, 857, Letter of
July 5, 1946, set out at 982). However, ~Ioreton freely admitted that his first discussion 'vith :Jfathesius
concerning the price which Columbia would pay for the
~I & H claims occurred at a meeting between nioreton and
~Iathesius in l\1oreton's office on Ocotber 8, 1948 (784).
At this meeting, nlathesius stated that since Columbia had acquired the ~Iilner claims it would be interested
in leasing the ~f & H properties. :Jiathesius asked l\Ioreton ·\vhat the ore \vas worth and he replied that it was
\vorth 25 cents a ton. ~Iathesius readily agreed to this
price ( 784, 785).
A few days after October 8, :Jiathesius and :Jioreton
had a telephone conversation in \Yhich they agreed that
the~ tonnage basis \Yould be 1.55 1nillion tons (794). According to Thioreton, the entire .. negotiations" consisted
of 38 \Vords ( 789). J[athesius told :Jioreton that Colmnbia "\vould pay :25 rents a ton based upon Colzunbia's estiInate of the tonnage and :Jioreton ans"~ered that that was
agreeable "Tith hin1 (789).
It is no,vhere eYen rlain1ed by anyone that there ",.ere
(\YPr an~T separate negotiations covering either the threefourth~ intPrPst of the eo-o,vners or the one-fourth interest of l\1oreton.
(f)

After l\tathPtdus and l\Ioreton had agreed upon a
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total price of $387,500 Columbia sent to Moreton a single
document containing the offer of sale for the entire prop-

erty by all four co-ovvners for a total sum of $387,500
(551, 769). This use of a single document was in accord-

ance with the standard practice of Columbia when they
·were dealing for property owned by more than one person (549).
Moreton, however, advised Colmnbia that he wanted
the transaction embodied, not in a single document, but in
two sets of documents : one to cover the sale of the threefourths interest of his clients at a price of $100,000 and
the other to cover the sale of his one-fourth interest for
$287,500.00 (551, 771).
Additionally, 11oreton, in compliance with the prior
request of M.athesius, procured the signature of his clients
to Exhibit P-19 dated October 13, 1948 (388). In this
document the tonnage is referred to as 1.5 million tons but
there is nothing in it with respect to the total price or the
price per ton which is to be paid (771).
Columbia agreed to l\1oreton's request that they
abandon their standard practice of using a single document embodying the offers of all four owners and instead
e1nployed two sets of documents, one covering the offer
of Moreton's clients and the other covering the ~ale of
Th1:oreton's one-fourth interest .alone ( 551). Thereupon
~Ioreton proceeded to procure the signature of his clients
to another document dated October 16, 1948, prepared by
him and stating that the co-owners were satisfied with the
sum of $100,000 and that Moreton could sell his interest
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for whatever price Columbia and he could agree upon
( 780, Exhibit P -16).
On November 20th, still another letter was prepared
by Moreton (Exhibit P-17) and presented to his clients
for their signatures (794, 795). It stated that it was no
concern of theirs as to when, to whom, at what price or
upon what terms Moreton may sell his interest. Again, as
in the letters of October 13th and 16th, notwithstanding
that all matters of price covering both Moreton's interest
and his clients' interest had been clearly and completely
resolved, the document which Moreton induced his clients
to sign was so misleadingly worded as to make it appear
that the matter of price was still for future determination.
It further appears that originally :\Ioreton and :Jiathesius had agreed that the purchase b~~ Columbia would
be handled under an escrow agreement and that this arrangement "\vas abandoned (791, 792). Of course, had the
transaction been handled by escrow all parties would
have been fully inforn1ed as to all matters, including the
total price paid and the .amount received by defendant
i\foreton.
(g)

On Decen1ber 19, 1948, the co-o\vners received a telegranl from ~Ioreton requesting that they come to Salt
Lake. On Decen1ber ~0~ 1948, they presented themselves
at l\loreton'.s office ( 39~). Dr. ~I a thesius and ~fr. Heald
of Columbia arrived. Heald turned oYer some papers to
l\1 ore ton 'vho then read the deed conyeying the interest
of the co-owners to Colu1nbia. The co-o"~lH~rs then affixed
their signatures to a receipt (393).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15

There was nothing said at this meeting about the
a1nount of money that Moreton was to received for his
interest. There was no mention of a figure of $387,500
nor of a figure of $287,500. No revenue stamps were
put on the deeds at that time (395).
We realize that there is .a conflict of evidence in this
matter, but the evidence must be viewed in its light most
favorable to plaintiffs and both Rex Holland (393-399)
and Clara I-Iolland ( 933-939) testified concerning this
matter as above outlined. Rex and his mother both testified that at the final meeting of December 20, 1948,
neither 1foreton, Mathesius, nor anyone else informed
them of the contract betvveen Columbia and Moreton
covering the sale of 1v1oreton's purported one-fourth
interest and the amount Columbia was paying Moreton
for his purported one-fourth interest and also the a1nount
Columbia was p.aying for the entire property; and that
Ivforeton also concealed the revenue stamps which were
to be attached to the separate deeds covering the interest
of Moreton and the interests of the co-owners.

r

This testi1nony is of particular significance in vie\v
of the fact that l\foreton testified that he and Mathesius
had agreed in October of 1948 that the co-owners vvere to
be fully informed as to the total price being paid and as to
the price paid for 1\Ioreton's interest, at the closing of the
transaction on Dec. 20, 1948 (777-780, 812). It would appear obvious, of course, that neither l\foreton nor Mathesius would have felt the need for any such arr.angements
except for the fact that they were both fully aware of the
ignorance of the co-owners as to the true situation. Thus
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it is both express and implicit on the record in this case
that all parties were aware that the co-owners did not
know the true _situation prior to December 20, 1948, and
of course, the testimony of the co-owners which the jury
had a right to believe and did believe and \vhich is to be
treated for the purposes of this appeal as conclusive, \Vas
that they were not informed on December 20, 1948.
Although because of the confidential relationship
which existed between the parties, it is not necessary to
show reliance by Rex and his father, John Holland, on
Moreton's representations the testimony and evidence at
the trial (395-399), was that had Rex known Moreton
was receiving $287,500 for his interest or that the ore
\vas being sold at twenty-five cents per ton or that the
entire property was worth $387,500, he would not have
signed the offers to sell the ~·~ interest for $100,000 (Exhibit P-15), the letter of October 16 (Exhibit P-16), the
letter of October 13 (Exhibit P -:~1) ~ the letter of ~{oveinber 20 (Exhibit P-17), or the ,,~arranty deed (Exhibit
P -22) ; that he \Yould not have accepted the check and that
he \vould not have signed the receipt for the check fro1n
Colun1bia (P-21) or signed the statutory deed to Columbia
(Exhibit P -:2:2) or the "~arr.anty deed to ~Ioreton (Exhibit
P-7).
It ,,T,as, of course, ~Ioreton ~s duty to tell Rex and the
C0-0\\Tner8 the~e things. n[oreton at the trial, after days
of Pva~ion, finally broke do\\~n under exrunination and
adn1itted that he nP,. .(~r told the co-o\vners ho\Y 1nuch he
\\'as getting for the propert~. . (51-±, lines ~-±-30):

uQ.

(I3~T ~lr.

Pollack)

''Till you llO\Y telline \Yhen
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it was that you told the Hollands and Murie,
for the very first time, that Columbia was
paying 25 cents a ton for the M&H claims~
A. I never told them that at any time.

Q. You never told them?
A.

No."
(h)

Three years later it vvas discovered ancl it is no\v
admitted that Moreton sold the entire property for $387,500 and that he received for the one-fourth interest which
he had fraudulently procured, $287,500.00 (400, 401).
It is manifest on the record that the confidential relationship existing between 11oreton and the Hollands
continued at least up until the time of the actual discovery
of his fraud and that appears from the fact that when
J-ohn Holland died on October 9, 1949, 1vforeton \vas employed by the Hollands to act as attorney for them and
the estate of John Holland and that he accepted that
e1nployment and continued in it until finally after the
actual discovery of the fraud by Rex I-Iolland, he was
discharged ( 940).
Rex first learned that the property had been sold
for $387,500 in October of 1951 (400). l-Ie was .at the
home of Bishop Parson U. Webster of Cedar City. Canfield stated that theM & II Claims had brought $387,000.
Rex was shocked to learn of this total price and after he
considered for some time he wrote l\ir. Moreton (401).
The letter he wrote was introduced as Exhibit P-21. In
this letter he reminds Moreton that Moreton had lead
them to believe that there was 1.6 million tons of good
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grade iron ore for which the steel company would pay
the owners 10 cents per ton. This was the first time that
the plaintiff, Rex, had learned of the fraud which had
been perpetrated upon him by his lawyer Moreton.
~1oreton

answered Rex by a letter of December 18,
1951 (Ex. P-25) in which l\foreton threatened to put Rex
in jail if Rex pursued the matter any further. Copy of
this letter was attached to plaintiff's amended complaint
( 43) and was, of cour.se, introduced in evidence at the
trial. There is no clearer indicia of 1foreton's fraud in
this case than his answer to Rex's letter. It not only gives
a clear indication of Moreton's guilt and his knowledge
of his guilt, but it also indicates 1Ioreton knew he was
dealing with simple naive people.
Rex went to the U.S. Attorney in Salt Lake City
to determine "\vhether he had violated the law in asking
Moreton for an adjustment (Ex. P-26, P-68). The U. S.
Attorney advised him of his rights and he then employed
counsel. Rex's counsel then wrote to Moreton requesting
information regarding the details of the transaction.
Hovvever, Moreton refused to furnish the information
( 531). After the investigation of this case "\Yas begun
by plaintiff's attorney, l\foreton began to "loan" ~furie
(one of the co-owners) $250.00 every single n1onth up to
at least the ti1ne of the trial.
(i)

Rex Holland is suing as the administrator of the Estate of his father John Holland, and Rex Holland is .also
a plaintiff in his individual capacity.
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This is a brief resume of the testimony in this case
and our intention is by it to give the Court a general
background of this case. As we deal with the specific
points involved we will go more into detail. Additionally,
for the convenience of the Court, we are collecting in a
separate pamphlet the testimony at the trial pertaining
to each of several points as to which we feel the Court
will want to be fully informed.
STATE1vfENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT I.
THE EXISTENCE OF A CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MORETON AND THE HOLLANDS WAS
ESTABLISHED AS A MATTER OF LAW.
POINT II.
THE BURDEN OF PROOF WAS UPON MORETON TO
ESTABLISH BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE
THAT THE CO-OWNERS WERE FULLY INFORIV1ED OF
ALL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE TRANSACTION, THAT
THE TRANSACTION BETWEEN HIM AND THE COOvVNERS WAS FAIR AND EQUITABLE AND THAT NO ADVANTAGE OF THE CO-OWNERS WAS TAKEN BY HIM.
POINT III.
THE EVIDENCE IS CONCLUSIVE THAT MORETON
DID NOT MAKE THE NECESSARY DISCLOSURE, THAT HE
MISREPRESENTED THE PRICE, THAT HE CONCEALED
THE PRICE AND THAT THE TRANSACTION WAS UNFAIR
AND THAT HE TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THE CO-OWNERS.
POINT IV.
THE EVIDENCE IS CONCLUSIVE THAT MORETON'S
F AlLURE TO MAKE THE DISCLOSURE CONCERNING PURCHASE PRICE WAS WILFUL AND DELIBERATE.
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POINT V.
AS A MATTER OF LAW THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD NOT RUN AT THE TIME THIS ACTION WAS
COlVIMENCED.
POINT VI.
REX HOLLAND AS ADJ\1INISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE
OF JOHN HOLLAND HAD STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO
BRING THIS ACTION AND DID NOT NEED SPECIFIC
COURT AUTHORITY.
POINT VII.
IN REINSTATING THE JUDGMENT THIS COURT
SHOULD ORDER THAT INTEREST BE ADDED THEREON
FROM THE 20TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 1948, TO DATE OF
FINAL ENTRY OF JUDGMENT.
POINT VIII.
JUDGMENT SHOULD BE ENTERED IN FAVOR OF
THE ESTATE IN THE SUM OF $120,833.00.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE EXISTENCE OF A CONFIDENTIAL RELATIO:t-~
SHIP BETWEEN MORETON AND THE HOLLANDS WAS
ESTABLISHED AS A MATTER OF LAW.

There can be no question about the fact that the defendant ~loreton \Yas .acting as the attorney and agent
for the other eo-O\\'"ners. He agreed to act as their attorney in obtaining a patent upon the I\f&H Clain1s and in
Helling the clain1s. \Ve sub1uit that under the evidence
in this case this confidential relationship appears as .a
1natter of la-\v.
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Re~

Holland testified as follows ( 337) :

"Q.

Was there anything else said in the conversation about what he was going to do, or vvhat
you shouldn't do, or anything of that kind~

A.

He told us at that time, that he, when we started on this patent, that he vvould be our attorney, that he would be our attorney in getting
the patent, and that he would also be our
attorney in the sale of these properties."

Moreton never denied that he had so told the coowners.
Every do cumen t used in the transaction between
lvforeton .and the co-owners wa.s prepared by 1\foreton
and presented to the co-owners. Never, at any time, did
they refuse to sign any document vvhich 1foreton placed
before them. The documents so signed present an impressive list:
1. The original agreen1ent signed in the spring of
1946. (This document was never produced by

nioreton and the co-owners did not have a copy
thereof.)
2. The extension of the option and agreement to
give an undivided one-fourth interest for patenting (Ex. P-4).
3. The undated option (Ex. P-5).
4. The agreement of ownership (Ex. P-6).
5. Warranty deed conveying one-fourth interest
to Moreton (Exhibit P-7).
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6. Letter of understanding (Exhibit P-8).
7. Power of attorney and authority to act (Exhibit
P-18).
8. Re-amended location certificate (Exhibit P-9).
9. Amended location certificate (Exhibit P-10).
10. Application for Patent (Exhibit P-12).
11. Three affidavits of citizenship (Exhibit P -13).
12. Letter of October 13, 1948 (Exhibit P-19).
13. Letter of October 16, 1948 (Exhibit P-16).
14. Letter of November 20, 1948 (Exhibit P-17).
15. Offer of October 16, 1948 (Exhibit P-15).
All of these documents affected the legal relations
existing between the co-o"\vners, the government and Columbia. They are the type of documents about which a
person would .seek legal advice and in preparing these
and presenting them to the co-owners for signature there
can be no question but \Yhat l\{oreton \vas acting as their
attorney. He is an attorney of long standing in the State
of Utah. The co-owners looked to him as their attorney
and he should not be per1nitted to no\Y say that he was not
acting in his profe.ssional capacity. The co-owners had
no other attorney fro1n \Yhon1 they obtained advice.
The closing of the transaction occurred in the office
of Moreton, the attorney (392). He there read to then1
the documents relating to the transfer of the interest of
the co-owners to Colu1nbia. He presented the documents
to the1n for their signature. In1plicit in his conduct was
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his advice that these documents were proper for them
to sign and would properly effectuate the intention and
desires of the parties. Here again, he was acting as the
.attorney for these people in effecting an eventual transfer
of their interest in the mining clain1s to Columbia.
He, in addition, acted as the agent of the co-owners
in negotiating the sale of the l\f & H mining claims. l\1athesius dealt with no one but Moreton. As a matter of
fact, when Rex wrote the letter of September 14, 1948, to
Mathesius, Mathesius refused to "go around" J.\!Ioreton
and took up the contents of the letter with him. Mr.
l\foreton on every occasion that he talked with Rex and
his father cautioned them not to talk with anybody about
the terms of this deal (445). l-Ie not only cautioned them
orally, but in a letter (Ex. D-33) he advised John Holland
"however, let me caution you again to leave the entire
bargaining .and selling of the_se properties to me as
agreed upon."
Further proof of the continued existence of the confidential relationship is found in the evidence that after
John I-Iolland died on October 9, 1949, the Holland family
employed ~A:oreton to handle John's estate. He continued
as attorney of record until the summer of 1953 (940).
The foregoing facts are admitted by all parties concerned and we submit that this confidential relationship
between the Hollands and Moreton was established as a
matter of law. In any event, the jury, under Instruction
No. 6, found that this relationship existed. Certainly
there can be no dispute that at least a question of fact
'vas presented on this matter and the court could not con-
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elude as a matter of law that there was no confidential
relationship existing between the.se parties.
POINT II.
THE BURDEN OF PROOF WAS UPON MORETON TO
ESTABLISH BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE
THAT THE CO-OWNERS WERE FULLY INFORMED OF
ALL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE TRANSACTION, THAT
THE TRANSACTION BETWEEN HIM AND THE COOWNERS WAS FAIR AND EQUITABLE AND THAT NO ADVAN·TAGE OF THE CO-OWNERS WAS TAKEN BY HIM.

Utah cases clearly require that where the existence
of a confidential relationship is established that any
transaction between the parties, in order to be upheld
when questioned by the confidant, must he shown to haYe
been fair and equitable, that no advantage has been taken
of him .and that he was fully infor1ned of all matters
relative to the transaction. The burden of establishing
these propositions is placed upon the advisor. This is
particularly true where the relationship of attorney and
client is shovvn to exist. The attorney is under a duty
to n1ake all of these disclosures and showings and if
his conduct is ever called into question he has the burden
of establishing these propositions by a preponderance of
the evidence.
In Omega Investnlcllt Co. r. TT-roolley, ~~ lTtah -±74,
271 Pac. 797, the relationship of attorney and client \Yas
involved. In addition the defendant attorney acted in
son1e ways as an agent of plaintiff. In that case shares
of stock h.ad been transferred to the defendant attorney.
rrhe trial court ordered hiln to re-convey the stock to
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plaintiff. This Court affirmed. The Court concluded, as
it must be concluded in the case at bar:
"There can be no question but that the trial
court was justified in drawing the conclusion that
a fiduciary relation existed between Baldwin and
Woolley at the time the stock in question in this
case was transferred. In fact, no other conclusion
can reasonably be drawn."
The Court, in discussing the law, then stated:
"The confidential relation being shown to
exist, the burden devolved upon Woolley to show
that, in the making of the transaction, the fullest
and fairest explanation and co1nmunication was
made to Baldwin of every particular in Woolley's
breast; that the transaction itself was fair, and
the consideration paid therefor adequate, before
a court is justified in permitting the transaction
to stand."
The Court again stated:
"Whether '"'"voolley had inforn1ation at that
time, that Baldwin did not have, of facts that
tended to enhance the value of the property, cannot be told. The burden under the authorities
vvas upon Woolley to show that he made a full
.and fair disclosure of all facts within his knowledge to Baldwin and that Baldwin entered into
the agreement freely and fully advised."

*

*

* *

*

* *

* * *

"Not only was the burden placed upon Woolley
to show a full and fair disclosure of all facts within his knowledge, but it was also his duty to show
that the transaction was f.air and equitable, and
that the consideration paid was adequate.''
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* *
"All of the instruments relied on by th·e defendant as the consideration for the transfer
of the stock were executed while the relation of
confidence existed between the parties, and are
burdened with the presumption that they were
executed as a re.sult of undue influence and fr.aud
without full disclosure of all facts known by
Woolley, and without an adequate consideration.
The same thing is true with reference to the
infringement contract and all other transactions
between these parties during the year 1924. No
attempt w.as made to overcome the presumption."
*

In the recent case of In Re Swan's Estate, 4 Utah
2d 277, 293 P. 2d 682, wherein an attorney was involved,
the Court reaffirmed the rule of the Omega case. In
discussing the effect of the presumption arising from
the existence of a confidential relationship, the Court
stated:
"Since this presumption has the ·effect of
shifting the burden of persuasion that these legacies were not induced by fraud or undue influence,
then in determining wheth-er the findings of the
trial court are sustained by the evidence, \Ye n1ust
assume that there was fraud or undue influence
unles.s the trial court is convinced that no fraud
or undue influence \Yas exercised, or unless the
evidence to that effect is so strong and convincing
that a finding to the contrary would be unreasonable. This is the rule that \Ve apply in this case
and the rule required by Rule 14(a) of the Uniforin Rules, and under it, the findings of the trial
court must be .affir1ned."
The Court concluded as follo,vs:
"After careful study and consideration 've
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conclude that this presumption shifts the burden
onto the confidential adviser of persuading or
convincing the fact finder by a preponderance of
the evidence that no fraud or undue influence
was exerted, or in other words, he has the burden
of convincing the fact finder from the evidence
that it is more probable that he acted perfectly
fair with his confidant; that he made complete
disclosure of all material information available
and took no unfair advantage of his superior position than that he exerted fraud or undue influence
to obtain the benefits in question."
The Court considered a situation where there is no
evidence contr.ary to that produced tending to show that
the confidential adviser had made the necessary disclosures. The Court stated:
"Such a finding is made ag.ainst the party
who fails to satisfy his burden even though there
is no evidence to the contrary. In other words,
the court must find the facts against a party who
fails to satisfy his burden and such finding does
not have to be supported by positive evidence."
vV e submit that the burden of persuasion was upon
defendant Moreton to convince the finder of f.act by a
preponderance of the evidence that the transaction between hirnself and the co-owners and the ultimate sharing
of the proceeds of the s.ale of the M & I-I Claims to
Columbia was fair and equitable, that he took no advant.age of them and that he at all times kept them fully
informed as to all matters relative to the transaction.
POINT III.
THE EVIDENCE IS CONCLUSIVE THAT MORETON
DID NOT MAKE THE NECESSARY DISCLOSURE, THAT HE
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MISREPRESENTED THE PRICE, THAT HE CONCEALED
THE PRICE AND THAT THE TRANSA,CTION WAS UNFAIR
AND THAT HE TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THE CO-OWNERS.

Under the authorities set forth in Point II even if
the testimony of Moreton disclosed that he had made
the necessary disclosures, the case should have been
submitted to a jury for its determination of whether or
not that testimony had convinced the jury by a preponder.ance of the evidence that ~Ioreton had made full disclosures of the price and terms of the sale which he
negotiated. Such is the direct language of this Court in
the last quotation under Point II. However, in this case
there is positive testimony that Moreton at no time made
the disclosures required by the rule and the evidence
establishes that the contract was not fair and equitable
.and the evidence further discloses that l\Ioreton did take
advantage of the Hollands.
As early a.s 1\iarch, 1947, ~Ioreton told the Hollands
that because of the overburden they could not expect
to get more than 10 cents a ton for the ore. He told then1
at that ti1ne that he thought he could get an overall
price of $133,000.00 (3-!-!). He reiterated this statement
in June of 19-!7 ( 358). The .agree1nent of o'vnership (Exhibit P-6) substantiates this nrisrepresentation. It mentions therein that the conten1plated selling price of the
1nining clai1ns was $133,333.33. The approxi1nate tonnage
,vhieh had been .spoken of 'Yas 1,500,000 ( 3-±3, 358). The
Hollands were never told anything different so far ns
price is concerned. l\Ioreton hilnself adn1itted that he
did not tell I-Iollands the price "Then he testified (83:2):
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"Q.

Will you now tell rne when it was that you
told the Hollands and Murie, for the very
first time, that Columbia was paying 25 cents
a ton for the M & H claims 1

A.

I never told them that at any time.

Q.

You never told them 1

A.

No."

The evidence is clea.r that in consu1nn1a ting this sale
the Hollands relied upon Moreton's statement that they
could not expect to get more than 10 cents for the ore
because of the depth of the overburden (528). The Hollands never did knovv that Moreton was getting $287,500,
or that the total price was $387,500. Both Rex and his
mother testified that at the meeting where the transaction
-vvas consummated there was no disclosure of the total
a1nount of the purchase price or the amount which Moreton was to receive (395, 933-939). Hence, \Ve have testiInony which definitely would support a finding that
disclosure was not made of the price which was to be
received. As originally prepared, the final papers were
drafted so that there would be but one group of papers
to cover the entire transaction ( 549, 550, 551). Subsequently, at 1foretons behest, this method of closing the
trans.action vvas abandoned and it was arranged for two
separate sets of papers to be drawn, one covering the
one-fourth undivided interest of Moreton and the other
set covering the undivided three-fourth interest of the
co-owners. It was never disclosed to the co-owners why
the transaction was handled in this manner. Nothing wa::,
ever said to them about the original documents whereill
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the entire transaction was placed in one set of documents.
The obvious reason for this division was to enable Moreton ·.to sell lhis 1interest without disclosure of what he
received or what the total purchase price was.
Moreton concealed the fact that he knew of Rex~s
letter of September 14, 1948 to Mathesius (526, 527).
However, this letter had been shown to Moreton by
Mathesius as early as October 8, 1948 (784-788). By
virtue of this letter, Mathesius required the statements
contained in the letter_s of October 16 and November 20
wherein the co-owners replied that they were satisfied
with the $100,000 for the three-fourths interest and that
it was of no concern of theirs how much Moreton received
for his interest (764, 765). No disclosure was ever made
of the reason for these documents and the co-owners
.signed them without question \vhen prepared and presented to them by Moreton.
l\{oreton never did reveal to the co-o\vners the content of the conversations which he had ·with ~Iathesius in
order that they would be fully infor1ned upon all phases
of the transaction wherein Moreton was acting as their
attorney. The evidence, without dispute, clearly establishes that the transaction bet,veen )foreton and the
I-Iolland.s was not fair and equitable and the evidence
discloses without question that Moreton took advantage
of the co-owners. The result of this transaction points
indubitably to the fact that l\Ioreton over-reaehed the
co-owners .and took advantage of his confidential relationship with the1n to acco1nplish this result. He so arranged and finagled this transaction that he received
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$287,500 for his undivided one-fourth interest and each
of the other co-owners received $33,333.33 for his undivided one-fourth interest.
We submit that not only did Moreton fail to sustain
the burden of proof which rested upon him, but the evidence clearly would require a finding that he had breached his confidential relationship with them and thereby
became liable to respond in damages for that breach
of confidential relationship. Under the authorities the
presumption alone would justify and support a finding
against 1foreton in favor of both Rex and John In re
Swan's Estate, supra.
POINT IV.
THE EVIDENCE IS CONCLUSIVE THAT MORETON'S
FAILURE TO MAKE THE DISCLOSURE CONCERNING PURCHASE PRICE WAS WILFUL AND DELIBERATE.

This case was sub1nitted to the jury upon the principles set forth in 2 Restatement of the Law of Agency,
Section 469, wherein it is stated:
"An agent is entitled to no compensation for
conduct which is disobedient or is a breach of his
duty of loyalty; such conduct, if constituting a
wilful and deliberate breach of his contract of
service, disentitles him to compensation for even
properly performed services for "\vhich no compensation is apportioned."
The comment to this section, so far as material here,
is as follows:
"An agent is entitled to no compensation for a
service which constitutes a violation of the agent's
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duties of obedience, stated in § 385. This is true
although the disobedience results in no substantial
harm to the principal's interests, and although
the agent believes that he is justified in so acting.
Language expressing insubordination as well as
disobedience acts may be sufficient to prevent the
agent from being entitled to recover compensation
for conduct of which the words are a part.
"b. A serious violation of a duty of loyalty
or seriously disobedient conduct is a wilful and
deliberate breach of the contract of service by
the .agent, and in accordance with the rule stated
in § 456, the agent thereby loses his right to obtain
compensation for prior services, compensation for
which has not been apportioned."

* * * * * * * * * *
"If the principal, in ignorance of the agent's
faulty conduct, pays to the agent compensation or
indemnity to which he is not entitled, the principal
can maintain an action to recover the amount."
In speaking of a similar situation, this Court in
Reich v. Christopulos, 123 Utah 137, 266 P2d 238, stated:
"In undertaking the sale of the pro~Jerty for
the Reiches, Hill had a duty to represent their
interest in good faith, to discharge it "\Yith reasonable skill and diligence and to disclose to them
all pertinent facts ".,.hich "\Yould n1aterially affect
their interest ...A. s is noted in An1erican Jurisprudence, (± A1n. Jur. 1067, Brokers Sec. 1-±2):
" tThe faithful disch.arge of his duties is a
condition precedent to any recovery upon the part
of a broker for the seryiees he has rendered his
principal. Thus, he is not entitled to con1pensation
if he fails to disrlose to his principal any personal
knowledge "~hich he possesses relative to 1natters
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which are or may be material to his employer's
interests * * .' "
See also Baird v. Madsen, 57 Cal. App. 2d 465, 134
P. 2d 885.
The evidence in this case establishes that Moreton's
breach of his confidential relationship was wilful and
deliberate in misrepresenting the price to be paid and in
concealing the price paid by Columbia for all three
n1ining claims and the .amount which he received for his
share. Moreton started out by representing that because
of the overburden the n1ost that could be received was
10 cents per ton. He never did tell them any differently
from this even though he knew that its value was greatly
in excess of this figure. The first time that any mention
of price is n1ade is after the Bureau of 1_\lfines report
dated ~lay, 1947 (Exhibit D-37). This was in June of
1.947 when the undated -vvritten option (Exhibit P-5) -vvas
prepared and presented to the co-owners for signature
by JYioreton. They readily signed the document. Later
he figured the best -vvay to handle the matter was to
enter into an agreeraent of ownership. This agreement
sho-vved that the contemplated price would be approxin1ately $133,333.33, but -vvith the understanding that there
might be some excess but it was the understanding of
the co-owners that this excess would not be more than
in the neighborhood of $22,000 putting the tonnage and
price at 1,500,000 and 10 cents ( 542).
The patent application was not prepared until
August 25, 1957. On September 14, 1948, Rex wrote a
letter to Mathesius concerning the sale of the M&H claims
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and requested a reply from M.athesius (E¥.llibit P-14).
l\fathesuis did not contact Rex, but on or about October
8, took the matter up with Moreton (784). Moreton never
did contact the Hollands concerning this letter. He
absolutely disregarded the fact that Rex at least was
contending he was entitled to a full one-fourth share.
Moreton proceeded to arr.ange things so that he could
obtain the $287,500 for his undivided one-quarter interest
without disclosing this to the co-owners. He refused to
permit the transaction to be closed with only one document disclo_sing the total purchase price (771). He arranged to have the documents in two sets, one for his
interest ; the other for the co-owners interest. At the
time of the closing of the transaction on December 20
it was arranged so that there would be no disclosure
to the co-owners of either the amount paid to him or
the documents relating to the sale of his interest. He
had the co-owners sign the two letters of October 16,
1948 (Exhibit P-16) and of November 20, 1948 (Exhibit
P -17). These letters denote a studied avoidance of disclosing the amount he 'vas to receiYe for his interest.
These documents only disclose the amount to be received
by the co-owner.s. The amount to Moreton is not disclosed. It also would appear from these documents that
the amount which Moreton 'vas to receive for his share
had not yet been agreed upon. As .a n1atter of fact the
record discloses that this 1natter had been detern1ined
as early as October 8, 19-±S. A letter dated October 15,
1948 (Exhibit P-43) discloses that the original proposal
for sale for $387,500 'Yns trans1nitted to l\foreton. It
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states that this proposal is pursuant to an earlier conversation of Octo her 9, 1948. All of this conduct on the
part of Moreton show.s without question that he was
intentionally and deliberately concealing and failing to
disclose the price and terms of the s.ale of the M & H
claims.
We submit that a court could rule that his conduct
was intentional and deliberate as a matter of law, but
certainly the foregoing conduct would support a finding
on the part of a jury that his conduct in this connection
w.as intentional and deliberate within the rule announced
by the authorities cited under this poirit.
POINT V.
AS A MATTER OF LAW THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD NOT RUN AT THE TIME THIS ACTION WAS
COMMENCED.

(a)

It should be noted initially that in this case there
was never at any time any duty upon any of the coowners to make any inquiry as to the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction; throughout the
trans.action a confidential relationship existed which warranted and justified them in relying completely on their
attorney, the defendant Moreton, and further, there never
was at any time available to them any means of which
they knew of discovering the correct purchase price from
any persons other than the defendant Moreton .and ColUinbia, both of whom, when Rex made inquiry, failed
to divulge the information.
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At least up to October 8, 1948, no price had been
agreed upon between Moreton and Columbia for the sale
of the property. Therefore, it must be concluded that
up to that time at least, no inquiry of any kind could
h.ave ever revealed the amount of the purchase price.
The remarks of Parley Canfield, a total stranger to the
transaction, to Rex on September 14, therefore, bore no
relation to the transaction itself and while they mo:tn2::.}tarily disturbed Rex, it must be borne in mind that
when shortly thereafter Rex discovered that Parley Canfield w.as mistaken, his confidence in his attorney 1Ioreton was justifiably, fully and completely restored.
The letter of Septeinber 14, 1948, from Rex to Mathesius based on this first conversation with Canfield \Yas
\Vritten three months before the transaction \vas closed.
It, of course, had absolutely nothing whatever to do with
the running of the statute of limitations. By the time the
sale was concluded the letter had dissipated itself. The
co-owners continued to follow ~Ioreton's advice and accept his statements and sign \vhatever he presented to
them. The confidence of the co-owners \vas continuing.
They proceeded with the sale. They \vere then defrauded
on December 20, 1948, \Vhen they receiYed $33,333.33 for
one-fourth and ~Ioreton received $~S7,500.00.
Nothing happened thereafter to create the slightest
suspicion on the part of the co-o,vners that their attorney
lvforeton w.as deliberatel~T and intentionally defrauding
them until October, 1951. They \\Tere, as a n1atter of la,v,
therefore, not required to n1ake any inquiry of any kind
before that tilne. 1\foreover, the law is that although
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they may have begun an inquiry which they abandoned
before the fraud was fully revealed, it in no w.ay affects
their rights or precludes them from maintaining the
action they would otherwise be entitled to maintain.
(b)

It is sometimes generally stated that the statute
of limitations shall begin to run against a defrauded
person from the time when he should have discovered
the fraud. However, that rule is subject to an overwhelmingly recognized exception in situations where confidential relationship exists (as it did in this case) between
the parties. The rule where confidential relationship
exists is that nothing short of actual discovery of the
full details of the fraud will set the statute in motion.
Some pertinent authorities announcing both the general rule and the law applicable to the case at bar are .as
follow (emphasis supplied throughout) :
Briece v. Bosso, 158 S.W. 2d 463, 467 (Mo. 1942, St.
Louis Court of Appeals):
"There must be reasonable diligence and the
means of knowledge are the same thing in effect
as knowledge itself. This rule, however, is subject
to qualification where a relation of trust and confidence exists between the parties. When a plaintiff is lulled into a sen8e of security by reason
of such relationship, rendering it the duty of the
defendant to disclose the truth, he is under no
duty to make inquiry and the statute does not
begin to run until actual discovery of the fraud."

Rutherford v. Rideout Bank, 11 Cal. 2d 479, 80 P.
2d 978, 981-983:
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"* * * It is, however, the contention of the
appellant that the fraud was open and patent,
that since the slightest inquiry would have disclos~d the truth, nothing but the plaintiff's inexcusable negligence kept her so long in ignorance
of the fact that she had not received a fair price
for her property, .and finally, the additional fact,
which came to light in September, 1927, was not
one of the facts constituting the fraud but merely
Taylor's motive for con1mitting it.

* * *
"* * * The finding of a confidential relationship is amply sustained by the evidence (Bank of
America v. Sanchez, 3 Cal. App. 2d 238, 38 P. 2d
787, and, in view of its existence, Mrs. Rutherford cannot be charged with lack of diligence in
making independent investigation either at the
time or afterward. Barron Estate Co. v. Woodruff
Co., 163 Cal. 561, 575-577, 126 P. 351, -±2 L.R.A.,
N.S., 125; Marston v. Simpson, 54 Cal. 189, 190."

Spencer v. Nelson, (Cal. App.) 238 P. 2d 169, 179:
"In Rutherford v. Rideout Bank, 11 Cal. 2d
479, 80 P. 2d 978, 117 A.L.R. 383, in order to gain
an advantage for a friend, the 1nanager of the
hank in which plaintiff \Yas a depositor and \Yho111
she constantly consulted on business affairs, 1nade
misrepresentations \Yhich caused her to sell her
ranch to the banker's friend for less than its true
value. It \vas not until approxin1ately seven years
later than plaintiff discovered the fr.aud. In the
meantilne plaintiff had n1ade no effort to ascertain the truth of the representations. In holding
that this fact did not bar her action for da1nages
the court said that in vie\Y of the confidential relationship bet\veen plaintiff and the bank n1anager
she could not be eharged "~ith lack of diligence
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in not making independent investigation either at
the time or afterward."
Butcher v. Newberger, 318 P.a. 547, 179 Atl. 240,
241-2:
"In 26 Corpus Juris, page 1137, it is said that
if fiduciary 'relation is obtained, nothing short
of actual knowledge will prevent recovery for
misrepresentations.' The jury has decided they
would obtain here and that plaintiff did not have
such actual knowledge. Indeed, they could not well
have concluded otherwise. In the instant case
plaintiff testified and no one contradicted him,
that he did not know anything about the stock,
would not have known the difference between
Class A and Common Stock if he had read the
certificate, and because of his 'implicit reliance
on Mr. Morles,' defendant's manager, he took the
certificate which the latter handed him. This the
jury believed * * *. Under such circumstances
plaintiff had the right to rely on the manager's
statement without inspecting that which was delivered to him, and this would be so even if plaintiff by inspection would have known he was not
getting what he had bought which was not the
case here. 615 Flatbush Ave. Corp. v. Hatoff, 126
Misc. 573, 214 N.Y.S. 138.'"'
37 C.J.S., page 268, Fraud, Section 27 b:

"If confidential relations obtained, nothing
short of .actual knowledge will prevent recovery
frorn misrepresentations."
54 C.J.S., page 198, Section 194:
"The failure of the defrauded person to use
diligence in discovering the fraud may be excused
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where their exists a relation of trust and confidence between the parties."
(c)

Where confidential relationships are shown to exist,
courts often reach the same result by in1posing an
estoppel against the adviser to plead the statute of limitation,s:
Anderson v. Thacher, 76 Cal. App. 2d 50, 172 P.
2d 533, 544-545 :

"* * * Defendant Thacher cannot be heard to
complain that plaintiff reposed too much confidence in him. 'No rogue should enjoy his ill-gotten_
plunder for the simple reason that lz is 1i icti1n is
by chance a fool.' Seeger v. Odell, supra, 18 C.al.
2d at page 415, 115 P. 2d at page 981, 136 ~-\_.L.R.
1291. The law does not applaud fraud and condemn the victim thereof for his credulit~~. ***
"* * * The possible but antiquated autlzority
that one m1tst assu1ne that e~·eryo1ze 1rith u·honl
he has a business transaction is a rogue and acts
accordingly 1cill not receire judicial approval.
Courts rather \Yill hold that one ean act upon the
presumption that there exists no intention to defraud hin1. Tide,vater Southern R. Co. v. Harney,
3~ Cal. App. 253, 260, lG~ P. 66-±. * * * \\T e therefore hold that the eYidence in this case is reasonably succeptible to the conclusion that there existed a continuing confidential and fiduciary relationship betw'een plaintiff and defendant Thacher. The evidence satifies us as it did the trial
court that the delay upon plaintiff's part about
which appellant Thacher con1plains "~as induced
by his O\\Tn representations to her, and bY reason
thereof, even if rit be conceded that th~ statute
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of limitations commenced to run as cont.ended for
by hirn he is estopped from taking advantage of
the statute. Calistoga National Bank v. Calistoga
Vineyard Co., 7 C.al. App. 2d 65, 72, 46 P. 2d
246."
In McKee v. Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 550,
206 P. 2d 715, 717, 718, 719, this Court, while finding
that the plaintiff in that case failed to prove facts sufficient to establish an estoppel, clearly announced its recognition of the estoppel rule, which, as appears from its
opinion in that c.ase, is plainly applicable to the case at
bar:
"Inasmuch as there is a period greater than
three year.s between the date of the accident and
the time plaintiff filed his application for compensation, the decision of the Industrial Commission
must be affirmed unless, .as plaintiff contends,
the statute has either been waived or the Pipe
Company is estopped from setting it up in bar of
plaintiff'.s claim. In this regard, plaintiff does not
claim he could not have discovered the true nature
of his injury immediately after the accident. In
fact, he must concede his own medical advisor
could have discovered the truth at any time by
taking X-ray pictures or by examining those taken
by the Pipe Company's doctor. Plaintiff seeks to
avoid his own failure to find out the real cause of
his trouble by contending that the company doctor
either mistakenly or intentionally informed him
that there had been no injury to his back; that he
had a right to rely and did, in fact, rely uzJon the
company doctor's diagnosis of the condition of his
back and in so dotng he has been mesled to his
prejudice.
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"It is well established that a statute of limitations will not run in favor of one who fraudulently
conceals another's right of action against hinL

* * *

"Under these circumstances, the narrow question to be decided is whether the Pipe Company
is estopped to set up the statute in bar assun~ing
an error was made by its doctor. Inasmuch as
the Industrial Commission held that Sec. 42-1-92,
U.S.C. 1943 was a bar to plaintiff's right to compensation, it nece_ssarily rejected plaintiff's theory
of estoppel. * * * if we are to reverse its decision,
we must be able to say that, as a matter of law,
the facts establish that all ele1nents of estoppel
are present. Before plaintiff can prevail upon a
theory of estoppel, it is incumbent upon him to
establish his reliance upon the con1pany doctor's
statement which we shall assume 'vas erroneous.

* *
"We think it is clear in this case that no
fiduciary relationship existed between the Pipe
Co1npany's doctor and the plaintiff inasn1uch as he
did not report to the doctor for a diagnosis of his
ailment or for n1edical assistance. * * * l-.-nder
these circun1stances, "\Ye believe that the colllillission could re.asonably conclude that plaintiff had
relied upon physicians of his O"\Yn choosing rather
than upon the state1nent of the con1pany doctor.
and therefore had failed to establish his plea of
estoppel."
*

(d)

The rule requiring diligence on the part of a plaintiff in order to avoid the bar of the statute of lin1itation~
is not applicable to the case before this Court for another
reason. That rule applies only "~here the n1eans of dis-
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covering the fraud are shown to have been available
to the defrauded party. It is manifest on the record in
the case at bar and conclusively established that neither
Rex Holland nor John Holland nor the Administrator
of John Holland ever had sufficient reason to suspect
or the means to discover the fraud.
lVIoreton, by his testin1ony, established that prior
to at least October 8th no one knew what price Columbia
"\vas to p.ay for the mining claims and it is also clear on
the record that after October 8th the only two parties
that did know what price Columbia was to pay were
~1oreton and Columbia.
No one aside from these two parties had facts in
their possession to give to either Rex Holland or John
Holland had either Rex or John Holland made any
inquiry. The record further establishes that not only
would inquiry of anyone else have been futile but that
any inquiry directed to Columbia or to Moreton would
have been equally futile.
Rex Holland did write to Columbia in the person
of its President, Dr. Mathesius, on September 14, 1948,
hoping to be advised as to the true situation. Mathesius
never .ans,vered Rex but he did take Rex's letter straight
over to Moreton, who proceeded to mislead Columbia
by reference to some of the cunningly drawn documents
which he had previously fraudulently induced his clients
to sign and by procuring the signature of his clients to
three further completely misleading letters (Exhibits
P-16, P-17 and P-19) which he prepared and so phrased
as to make it appear to his clients that the price c·olumbia
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was to p.ay had not yet been established even though
l\foreton and Mathesius had known the price since at
least October 8th.
In a situation such as this, the courts have in unmistakable language announced that the wrongdoer shall
not be permitted to keep the profits of his fraud by
asserting th.at his victim should not have trusted him
but should have questioned him sooner. The courts have
made it clear that the statute 'vill not be set in motion
where the only 1neans for discovering the fraud lay with
the party perpetrating the fr.aud and. \\There any other
means "\Vere shown to have been foreclosed.

Adams v. Harrison, 3-:1 Cal. App. 2d 288, 93 P. 2d
237, 243-244:
"Moreover, it does not appear that means of
knowledge were then open to the respondent or
that any reasonable inquiry on his part ''""ould
have developed the true facts "ith respect to the
real fraud, vvhich is here in issue. It appears that
after he had reoeired au inti;nation of this fraudJ
in 1936, the ~responden-t ·zreut to J·udson, franz
whonz the land had been, purchased~. to Ju.dson 's
attorney and to the real estate agent \Yho had
represented Judson, all of zchonz refused to give
hin1 any infornzation on that subject. It does not
appear that an earlier inquiry \rould have been
1nore .successful, and it is not to be anticipated
that the appella1lf 1could hare been any nzor.e helpful had an inquiry been nz.ade of h·hn.
Sl~JJIC .,,_

J.l!alouf, 95 ('1al App.

~d

8:2, :212 P.:2d 946,

960-961:
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"Defendants cannot prevail on the point of
discovery unless the record shows, as a matter
of law, that avenues of inquiry were open to Sime,
which, if explored, would have resulted in discovery of the fraud. In order that one who claims
to have been defrauded be charged with constructive kno\vledge of the facts constituting the fraud,
it 1nust appear not only that he h.ad notice of
facts sufficient to put a prudent person upon
inquiry, but also that means for the discovery of
the facts were available to him. Hobart v. Hobart
Estate Co., supra, 26 Cal. 2d at page 435, 159
P. 2d 958; West v. Gre.at Western Power Co.,
supra, 36 Cal. App. 2d 403, 407, 97 P. 2d 1014;
Adams v. Harrison, 34 Cal. App. 2d 288, 299, 93
P. 2d 237. It is argued by defendants that inquiry
made of some of the defendants would have developed the facts constituting the conspiracy, and
that if plaintiff had taken depositions in the action
of sunday against E. R. & W. he would thus have
uncovered the facts. A sufficient answer is that
the trial court did not believe the means of discovery were available to plaintiff in a practical
sense. We have no hesitation in agreeing with this
view. Plaintiff could not fairly have been charged
with notice of facts which he could have [,earned
only ottt of the mouths of the conspirators, tuho
were successfully endeavoring to conceal them.
Adams v. Harrison, supra, 34 Cal. App. 2d 288,
299, 93 P. 2d 237; see also Kimball v. Pacific Gas
& Elec. Co., 220 Cal. 203, 30 P. 2d 39; Kane v.
Cook, 8 Cal. 449; Marshall v. Buchanan, 35 C.al.
264, 95 Am. Dec. 95."
Vanzandt v. Vanzandt, 86 So. 2d 466, 470-471 (Sup.
Ct., Miss. 1956) :
"It is argued by the appellants, however, that
the appellees cannot invoke the foregoing statute
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becau,se they fail to exercise re.asonable diligence
to discover the fraud. This argument by appellant
must likewise be held to be untenable * * * he
has persisted in * * * (his misrepresentation) * * *
throughout and even in the trial of this lawsuit,
and it is manifest that no inquiry ntade of hirn
would have disclosed any other information. fie
occupied a position of trust and confidence with
appellees which was calculated to cause them to
rely upon his statement even if inquiry as to the
true facts had been made. We think, therefore,
that the Chancellor was amply w.arranted under
the evidence in finding that there had been no
lack of diligence on the part of the appellees."
(e)

It is, moreover, clear that the circumstances in this
case surrounding the letter of September 14th, written
by Rex to Dr. Mathesuis, \vere not, as a 1natter of la-\-r,
sufficient to put him on .any inquiry in vie\v of the existence of the confidential relationship bet\Yeen him and the
defendant Moreton. (That he did actually conunence an
inquiry is, of course, no bar. See Hobart \. Hobart,
supra). It n1ust be .re1nen1bered that Rex did not learn
of any "facts" which caused hi1n to \Yrite that letter.
The incident "\Yhich g.aYe rise to the letter "\Yas a casual
conversation \vith a total stranger nan1ed Parley Canfield who had nothing to do 'vith the transaction. Even
Canfield did not give Rex any ~'facts~, as to the trans.action. He gave only son1e 1nisinforn1ation as to the
amount of tonnage "Thich he (Canfield) believed to be
in the M & H Clailns and as to the price "\Yhich he (Canfield) believed to have been paid for son1e ore.
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The law is clear that such a casual statement of
opinion, belief and misinformation from .a stranger to
the transaction is not the kind of "discovery'' which will
set the statute of limitations in 1notion so as to protect
an attorney willfully and intentionally defrauding his
clients.
54 C.J.S., 197, Limitations of Actions, Section 191:

"* * * a mere suspicion of fraud is not sufficient to constitute a discovery which will set the
statute in motion."
I-Iartford Empire Co. v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 47 F.
Supp. 711, 716 (D.C. vV.D. Pa. 1942) :

"The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in
Emery v. Third National Bank of Pittsburgh, 308
Pa. 504, on page 513, 162 A. 281, on page 284,
where a charge of misrepresentation of the value
of certain assets was made, s.aid: 'But a bare
suspicion or an opportunity to learn the truth
through the exercise of reasonable diligence does
not constitute knowledge of fraud sufficient to
prevent recovery.' This statement of the law was
reaffirmed in a second hearing of this case at
314 P.a. 544, 171 A. 881. We therefore conclude
defendant is not barred from setting up the fraud
alleged in the answer and counterclaim, either by
the Pennsylvania statute of limitation or by
laches."
~~ttarkweather

v. Benjamin, 32 Mich. 305, 306 (1875):

"It is alleged as error .also that the court
should not have ruled out the common rumor concerning the size of the land. * * *
"It would be absurd to allow street talk about
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the size of a farm to rebut the conclusions of
fraud arising out of positive untruths. It is certainly not presumable that others will know better
than the parties interested; and even if such
rumors have been multiplied and brought home
to Benjamin, he would be justified in believing
Starkweather's statements based on better kno\vledge."
Williarns v. Riddlesperger, 217 Ala. 62, 114 So. 796,

798 (1927) :

"There is no merit in defendant's contention
that their rejoinder to plaintiff's replication to
the plea of lin1itation w.as conclusively established
by the evidence. The mere opinion of an attorney
to whom plaintiff casually mentioned her first
purchase of stock that it was worthless * * * a·id
not amount to knowledge or notice of the falsity
of the representations rnade to plaintiff by a.efendants. Certainly they cannot with propriety contend
that plaintiff was bound, as a rnatter of laze, to
accept the attorneyl s ttl1tfavorable opinion, and to

discredit the specific statements of fact made to
her by these defendants \Yhonl she kne,,. . to be
well inforn1ed and upon \Yhose business character
and judgment she strongly relied.'"
Haight v. Hoyt, 19 N.Y. 464, 6-±S:
'''~

* * A party nzakhzg fraudulent represen-

tations upon the sale of property by hi.nz cannot
defend hin1sel.f, as a nzatter of la1r. upon the
grou.nd that a btJSfander stated the real facts. The

purchaser Inay '-rely upon the staten1e~ts of the
vendor; and \Yhether he does so relY and is thereby induced to purchase is a questio~ for the jury.
It does not appear that the plaintiffs had any
other 1neans of ascertaining the truth than the
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statements made by Hoyt and Delavan at the time
of the purchase. They were not, therefore, guilty
of any negligence in not ascertaining the facts."
(f)

It should not and is not the policy of the law to
permit the confidential relationship of .attorney-client
to be destroyed upon the statement of a mere bystander
to a transaction between the attorney and his client.
Yet that would be the effect of a decision that the unsupported statements of Canfield (which within two
·weeks Rex discovered were mistaken) were sufficient as
.a matter of lavv to destroy the attorney-client relationship between Rex and the defendant Moreton and to
require Rex from that point on to question and investigate everything that his attorney, Moreton, said and
did. There '.vould be nothing left to the relationship
of attorney-client if such a proposition were held to be
the law and if a client were required at his peril to be
on notice .as against his own lawyer every time he heard
something from someone in the street.
The courts have recognized the importance of upholding confidential relations and have refused to announce any rule which would permit them to be destroyed
upon the statements of strangers or upon circun1stances
giving rise to suspicion.

Larson v. JJcMillan, 99 Wash. 626, 170 P. 324, 325326:
"This is an action for deceit. The principal
question is whether the .action is barred by the
statute of limitations.
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'"Whatever their relations to others may have
been, the principles in this unfortunate affair
were not dealing at arm's length. They were conjugate; and their relations inter sese were as
fiduciary as if the rnarriage had been a valid one.
The trust of a wife is not to be swept away as a
thistledown by a breath of suspicion. It is the
policy of the law, for the good of society demands
it, that trust and confidence between a husband
and wife shall be sustained to the very limit."
Sp~encer ~

Nelson, (Dist. Court of App. Cal. 1st

Dist.) 238 P. 169, 178, 179:
"The character of the hostility between the
parties must be considered. * * * 'Differences
might have existed without destroying confidence
in each other's honesty and integrity.' Shiels Y.
Nathan, 12 c·al. App. 618, 108 P. 3-±, 40. There
husband and wife had had 'differences' and separated on the very date the contr.act "'\Yas entered
into, relying upon the husband's representations.
In Ran1os v. Pacheco, 64 Cal. App. 2d 304, 309, 148
P. 2d 704, it "\Vas contended that by reason of
respondent's fear of .appellant induced by hi8
threats against her the confidential relationship
ceased to exist. The court held that this did not
destroy the confidential relationship. The question of "'\vhether the situation should have put
defendant on inquiry is one of fact for the trial
court. We cannot say as a n1a tter of la"'\Y that during this period anything occurred "'\Yhich should
have Inade defendant suspicious that he had been
overreached. A reasonable interpretation of the
hostility is that it indicated at n1ost that plaintiff
was standing strictly on his rights under the contract but gave no indication to defendant that the
contract itself "'\Yas not binding. £./or 'leas it such
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that we can say as a matter of law that it overcame the confidential relationship which in spite
of it still existed between plaintiff and defendants
and therefore put defendants on inquiry as to the
validity of the contract."
Hunt v. Smith, 24 S.E. 2d 164, 167 (Sup. Ct. S.C.

1934) :
"The question is: when did the appellant
discover the facts constituting the fraud~

* * *
"* * * the grantee's failure to reconvey the
property within the time agreed, and his failure
subsequently to carry out his successive promises
to make the reconveyance, did not constitute notice
to the appellant of the fraudulent scheme. * * *
Although his non action and his broken promises
should have giv,en rise to suspicion and would
have warranted and indeed called for the institution of the action at a much earlier date, it
would be putting a premium on dishonesty to hold
in this case that because the appellant hung onto
the hope (even a hope punctured by doubt and
fear) that ultimately the grantee would carry out
his assurances, she was under a l.egal obligation
to determine that the grantee had undertaken to
defraud her or her property."
(g)

In the case at bar it is crystal clear that as a matter
of fact the confidential relationship between the parties
was never destroyed until long after the transaction
was consummated. Moreton knew after September 14th
.and throughout the remainder of the transaction that
the co-owners were continuing to rely on him as their
attorney and he never told them to go to any other
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attorney. The co-owners on their part never discharged
1\{oreton after the conversation between Rex and Canfield
or after the letter which Rex wrote to l\1:athesius on
September 14th. r~othing is more conclusive of their
implicit and continuing confidence in 1\l:oreton as their
attorney than the fact that in 1949, .after this transaction
was consummated, the Hollands employed Thioreton as
the attorney for the Estate of John Holland. He himself accepted that employment and he continued in that
capacity until he was discharged in 1953.
The California case of Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co.,
26 Cal. 2d 412, 159 P. 2d 958, 972, 972-97-±, involved both
the existence of a confidential relationship and the issue
of \vhat kind of discovery on the part of the victim of
the fraud is .sufficient to set the statute of limitations
in motion. In that case the plaintiff had actually participated in depositions which brought out son1e of the facts
of the fr.aud of his fiduciary, an attorney named Greene.
The depositions and the investigation in connection therewith vvere apparently abandoned before Greene's fraud
was fully uncovered. The date of the depositions \Yas
such that if they con.stituted the type of discovery that
would set the statute of linlitations in n1otion, then plaintiff's cause of action against his fiduciary "~as barred.
Because the California Supren1e Court in that case
explored so1ne of the problen1s inYolYed here so completely, we quote at length fron1 its opinion in w~hich it
held that the plaintiff's cau.se of action \Yas not barred,
notwithstanding that an investig.ation \Yhich, if pursued,
would have led to a full discovery of the fraud "~as begun
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and then abandoned, and that this was so because of
the existence of a fiduciary relationship between the
parties.
flobart v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal. 2d 412, 159 P.
2d 958, 971, 972-97 4:

"* * * A defrauded person, how,ever is not
barred from maintaining an action 1nerely because
he comn~enced an investigation if it was incomplete or abandoned before discovery of the falsity,
particularly if the defendant has a superior knowledge of the facts, or if it is difficult for the p.laintiff to ascertain all the facts or he is not competent
to judge the facts without expert assistance. See,
for example, Shearer v. c·ooper, 21 Cal.
2d 695, 702, 704, 134 P. 2d 764; French v. Freeman, 191 Cal. 579, 587, 588, 217 P. 515; Payne
v. Clow, 114 Cal. App. 597, 600, 601, 300 P. 138;
Wilson v. Municipal Bond Co., 7 Cal. 2d 144, 151,
152, 59 P. 2d 97 4; 37 C.J.S., Fraud, Sections 3739, pp. 286-288. * * * Moreover, there was evidence
that plaintiff did not make a complete investigation because of his reliance upon Greene's representations. See Shearer v. Cooper, supra, 21 Cal.
2d 695, 704, 134 P. 2d 764; Div,ani v. Donovan,
214 Cal. 447, 453, 6 P. 2d 247.
u Defendants

contend that certain facts known
to plaintiff should have aroused his suspicions
and precluded his reliance upon the repres,entations assertedly made by Greene. It appears that
the proponents in the will contest took the deposition of Howard G. Stevenson, secretary of the
company, .and that Lachmond was present as attorney for plaintiff and inquired of Stevenson
concerning the value of the company's assets and
examined copies of the balance sheets of the com-
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pany for the years 1932, 1933, and 1934, which
listed all the assets and liabilities of the company.
Defendants .argue that having acquired this information through his attorney, plaintiff could
not rely upon Greene's representations of value.
* * * It is obvious that the balance sheets did
not fairly represent the actual value of the corporate assets and that plaintiff had been so informed. It cannot therefore be said, as a matter
of law, that plaintiff was prevented from acoepting the representations of Greene as true because
of the difference in the value of the stock as
shown by the books and as represented by Greene.

*

* *

"Defendants assert that in addition to these
requirements plaintiff must show that he made a
diligent inquiry to discover whether or not he had
been defrauded, and they argue that plaintiff
failed to prove that earlier inquiry would not have
revealed the falsity of the alleged representations.
It is not in .every case, however, that a person
is barred after three years by fail'llre to ptttrsue
an available means of discoveri1~g possible frau,d.

* * *
" * * * Accordingly, we must now determine
whether plaintiff has brought himself ·w·ithin the
exception to the statute of lin1itations. Plain tiff's
evidence, if believed, di-sclosed certain factors that
may have tended to discourag.e the 1naking of an
exhaustive independent ·inrestigati.on, and ·zce cannot hold, as a nzatter of laze, that any of the circuJnstances knou~ n to plai'ldiff shou1 a have p'llf a
reasonably prudent 1nan. upon ·inquiry. * * *
"A not her pertinent factot'" is that thet~e was a
judiciary rtelatio·nship bet·zceen the parties at the
tinte of the f1·andtt1ent represe1dati.ons. Although
the general rules relating to pleading and proof
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of f.acts excusing a late discovery of fraud remain
applicable, it i.s recognized that in cases involving
such a relationship facts which would ordinarily
require investigation may not excite suspicion,
.and that the same degree of diligence is not required. * * *''

* * *
uDefendants argue that the fiduciary relationship terminated when the sale was completed and
that plaintiff was no longer entitled to the benefit
of the rule. The relationship, nevertheless, did
exist at the time of the asserted fraud, and plaintiff was under no duty to make a complete s,earch
and reexamination of the entire transaction immediately after it took place merely because the
fiduciary relationship betw,een the parties was
terminated thereby."
(h)

Another point to be noted In connection with the
statute of limitations is that the defendant Moreton
cannot urge that by recording the deeds he set the statute of limitations in motion. The rule is that where a
confidential relation is shown to exist the recording of .a
deed does not give constructive notice of the fraud.

Seeger v. Odell, 18 Cal. 2d 409, 115 P. 2d 977, 980981:

"*** it is well established that he is not held
to constructive notice of a public record which
would reveal the true facts. Rest. Torts, sec. 540
(b) ; see cases cited in 12 Cal. J ur. 764, 759;
Prosser, Torts, 750, 751. The purpose of the recording acts is to .afford protection not to those
who make fraudulent misrepresentations, but to
bona fide purhasers for value."
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J(auffman v. McLaughlin, 189 Okla. 194, 114 P. 2d
929, 935:
"It is contended by the Kauffn1ans that the
cause of action was barred by the several provisions of the statute of limitations. In Clover,
Adm'x. v. Neely, 116 Okl. 155, 243 P. 758, we held:
'When a relation of trust or confidence exists,
making it the duty of defrauder in the trust eapacity to disclose the true state of fa~ts, the defrauded party is not charged with constructive
di.scovery of the fraud on account of the facts
being a matter of public record.'"

Barder v. lllcClung, 93 Cal. App. 2d 92, 209 P. 2d
808, 811:
"Neither can it be said that plaintiff \vas
bound by constructive notice of the zoning ordinance, because as stated in Seeger v. Odell, 18 Cal.
2d 409, 415, 115 P. 2d 977, 980, 136 A.L.R. 1291:
'The purpose of the recording acts is to afford
protection not to those ''Tho n1ake fraudulent misrepresentations, but to bona fide purchasers for
value.' "
Peterson v. Peterson, 105 lltah 133 (1943), 141 P. 2d
882, 885:
"Lastly, Charles urges that the Yarious claims
set up by the plaintiffs are barred by the statute
of limitations. '\V--ith this "Te are unable to agree.
Plaintiffs testified that they first got notiee of
this alleged fraud in 1941 "Then Charles for the
first tin1e asserted that plaintiffs had no interest
in an~- of the property. Charles contends that
plaintiffs had notiee of the alleged fraud or breach
of trust as early as 1935 \rhen he recorded their
quit clain1 deed. But \Yhat "Tas there in the recording of that deed \\Thich \\Tould giYe plaintiffs notice
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that he had breached his trust~ Such recordation
was entirely consistent with the intent of all concerned for they intended to put title into Charles
so that he could, according to their theory, take the
necessary steps to save the land."
See also 54 C.J.S. 194, Limitations of Actions, Section 189(b); Heap v. Heap, 258 Mich. 250,242 N.W. 252;
Fa~tnt v. Hosford, 119 Io"ra 97, 93 N.W. 58; Gerlach v.
Sch~tltz, 72 Idaho 567, 244 P. 1095.
(i)

lTnder the facts and circumstances of this case .and
under the decisional and statutory law of this state the
suit commenced by Rex Holland in his individual capacity is clearly not barred by the four year statute of
limitations applying to the breach of a fiduciary relationship, 78-12-25, 2, Utah Code Annotated 1953. J(amas
Securities Co. v. Taylor, 119 Utah 241, 226 P. 2d 111.
In that case a corporation brought suit against the
secretary of the corporation for a breach of his fiduciary
duty, he having delivered to a debtor securities held on
the obligation and at a time when the obligation had
become barred by the statute of limitations. In considering this problem the court stated:
"It is further contended that action against
defendant is for fr.aud, and that the three year
period of limitations provided by 104-2-24 ( 3) had
run between the date of discovery by some of the
directors in the summer of 1943 that defendant
had surrendered the stock, and the date when suit
was filed. It is true that the allegations of the
amended complaint charge that defendant em-
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ployed deceit, but viewing the charge i~ its. entirety it is clearly one of breach of a fiduciary
duty which would mean that the four year statute
of limitations would be applicable, 104-2-30. The
contention that action was barred by limitations
was therefore properly overruled."
The defendant l\1oreton did not rely upon this section of the statute and under Rule 9 (h) it was neces.sary,
if he relied thereon, to specifically designate this section
and sub-section. In any event, the action of Rex Holland,
individually, was filed one day before the expiration of
the statute. The complaint was filed December 19, 1952.
As regards the cause of action of the Estate of John
Holland:
Moreton again did not rely upon this section of the
statute. As indicated under Rule 9 (h) it was necessary
if he relied thereon to specifically designate this section
and sub-section. Having failed to do so, he cannot clai.In
the benefit of it.
(j)

The administrator of the estate of J olm Holland first
entered this action by the an1ended con1plaint which '\Yas
filed November 7, 1953. The order authorizing the appearance of the said administrator '\Yas dated Deeeinber
4, 1953.
The record conclusively establishes that John Holland and his estate did not discover the fraud until October of 1951 and there '\Yas no duty on his part to n1ake
investigation and there '\Yere no facts "yhieh came to his
attention '\vhich \Yould require hin1 to 1nake inquiry before
that time.
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That being so, the statute of limitations .as a matter
of law did not start to run until Octobe-r, 1951, and the
filing of the complaint was within the three year period
from that time and hence the court was in error in directing a verdict in favor of the defendants.
The trial court also mentioned a one year statute of
limitations. The statute referred to was Section 78-12-37,
which, in .so far as material here, provides:
"If a person entitled to bring an action dies
before the expiration of the time limited for the
commencement thereof, and the cause of action
survives, an action may be commenced by his
representatives after the expiration of that time
and within one year from his death."
The purpose of this statute is not to limit the cause
of action of the estate, but i.s rather to extend it. If the
statute of limitations applicable to the particular action
extends beyond the year, then this longer period is the
one within which the administrator has to bring the
action.
In Gray Realty Co. v. Robinson, 111 Utah 521, 184
P .2d 237, this Court held in an action against the estate
that this section permits an action to be brought within
one year from the death of the deceased, but if the applicable statute extends to a later date then the .applicable
statute prevails. This is the general holding of the
courts on statutes of this kind. 2 Bancroft's Probate
Practice ( 2 Ed.), Sections 495 and 496.
We submit that under the facts of this c.ase this
statute is not applicable because the fraud statute in this
case extends beyond the year from the death.
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POINT VI.
REX HOLLAND AS ADMINISTR.ATOR OF THE ESTATE
OF JOHN HOLLAND HAD STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO
BRING THIS ACTION AND DID NOT NEED SPECIFIC
COURT AUTHORITY TO DO SO.

One of the reasons given by the court for granting
the motion of the defendants for a directed verdict
against the estate of John Holland w.as that the administrator had not obtained authority of the court to bring
the action and to enter into the contract on behalf of the
estate (962). We assume this referred to the contract
employing the attorneys.
A moment's reflection convinces that this ground
is absolutely without merit of any kind. Action is brought
to obt.ain assets of the estate and the person against
vvhom the action is brought, although it is for the benefit
of the estate, contends that the administrator should not
.be permitted to do so. The only tin1e this matter may
be properly presented is \Yhen the ad1ninistrator seeks
court approval of the costs, expenses and attorney fees
which vvere expended, or incurred, in 1naintaining the
suit.
But in any event, there is a statute in the State of
Utah which gives the ad1ninistrator authority to bring
suits of this kind. Section 75-11-5, [~tall Code . .-!nuotated .
1953, provides :
''Actions for the recoYery of any property,
real or personal, or for the possession thereof,
or to quiet title thereto, or to deter1nine anY adverse clain1 thereon, and all actions founded 'upon
eontracts, 1nay be 1naintained by and against exe-
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cutors and administrators in all cases in which
the same might have been maintained by or
against their respective testators or intestates.''
There is abundant authority for the proposition that
this statute me.ans what it says and permits the administrator to do just as the administrator did in this case.
I-Iatch v. Hatch, 46 Utah 218, 148 Pac. 433; In Re Burt's
Estat~e, 58 Utah 353, 198 Pac. 1108, 2 Bancroft's Probate
Practice ( 2 Ed.), 543, Sections 44 7, 448 :
POINT VII.
IN REINSTATING THE JUDGMENT THIS COURT
SHOULD ORDER THAT INTEREST BE ADDED THEREON
FROM THE 20TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 1948, TO DATE OF
FINAL ENTRY OF JUDGMENT.

A judgment on the verdict was rendered July 10,
1957, in the sum of $120,833 and the portion of the judgment for interest w.as left blank ( 281). Of that amount,
$25,000 was for punitive damages leaving general damages in the surn of $95,833. This latter figure constituted
one-third of the $287,500 which Rex was entitled to as
damages for a wilful breach of a confidential relationship.
Under the evidence Rex was entitled to this money on
December 20, 1948. Hence the judgment should ,award
interest to Rex at the rate of 6% per annum since that
date. This Court has held that in a case similar to this,
interest should commence to run from the date the property was acquired by fraud. Gillespie v. Blood, 81 Utah
306, 17 p .2d 822.
POINT VIII.
JUDGMENT SHOULD BE ENTERED IN FAVOR OF
THE ESTATE IN THE SUM OF $120,833.00.
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Individual defendants moved for a directed verdict
against the administrator of the estate (237-242). As
against the estate this motion was granted (960). As a
necessary result, the case of the estate of John Holland
was not submitted to the jury. However, the issues in
the case were identical, involving as it did, the existence
of a confidential relationship, whether or not there had
been a complete disclosure by Moreton as well as a
showing that the transaction was fair and equitable and
that no adv.antage was taken of the Hollands. There
was also the determination of whether or not the breach
of the confidential relationship was wilful or deliberate.
Also, there was the issue of the statute of limitations.
While we have found no authority directly in point
on this subject, we submit that the finding of the jury
would necessarily have been the same against the defendant on behalf of the e.state and that therefore judgn1ent
should be entered for the estate in the same an1ount as it
was entered for Rex Holland.
In any event, 've sub1nit that the evidence establishes
as a matter of law the cause of action of the estate as
indicated in the foregoing argument and authorities and
upon this ground also a judg1nent should be entered in
favor of the administrator of the estate and against the
defendants in the su1n of $120,833.00.
CONCLUSION
Everything necess.ary to establish plaintiffs' right
to recover against l\[oreton and his fan1ily can be found
in the docun1ents theinselYes that l\Ioreton hin1self drafted
and his o'vn testilnony. Resort need not be had to any
of plaintiffs' testin1ony.
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A mere statement of the end result obtained by Moreton for himself is more than enough to convince anyone
of the fact that he, attorney Moreton, was unf.air, inequitable and overreaching in his dealings with the trusting
co-owners and .systematically concealed the selling price
from them.
(1) Moreton had been an attorney, at the time of
the trial of this case for over 40 years (583). He was
experienced in mining law. He prepared almost every
one of the legal documents mentioned in this law suit.
( 2) The co-owners were aged, ailing, trusting, naive
individuals. They had never before sold any mining
property.
(3) Moreton never denied Rex's testimony that he,
:Jioreton, had stated at his very first meeting with the coowners that he would henceforth .act as their attorney in
the patenting and sale of the property.
(4) The confidential relationship existed by reason
of the facts that Moreton at all times obviously acted as
attorney for the co-owners, as agent for the co-owners
besides being a co-tenant of the co-owners.
(5) Moreton, in his own letters directed the coowners not to discuss the sale of the property with .anyone else.
(6) ~Ioreton must have known of the potential
value of the property from the very beginning, otherwise
he would not have sought the co-owners out and offered
to take an option to buy the co-owners interest for $100,000.00.
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(7) Moreton told the co-owners on several occasions
that they could not expect to get more than 10c per ton
because the ore in their property was covered by a very
substantial overburden. Rex remembered these statements .and that was one of the reasons why he concluded
that Canfield's remarks about ore being offered at 25c
a ton would not apply to the co-owners' property.
(8) Nowhere, (except in the original contract of
sale drafted by Columbia, which Moreton rejected and
de.stroyed and which the co-owners never saw) in any
document Moreton or anyone else ever drafted does the
total sale price appear. Moreton does not clain1 that the
C0-40WneTs! \ever saw any document that disclosed the
amount of money that he received from Columbia for his
one-fourth interest.
(9) The letters of October 16, 1948 and November
20, 1948, that Moreton prepared and to \Yhich he secured
the signatures of the co-o\vners, are concealing, misleading and deceiving, in that an1ongst other things, they ll11ply that Moreton has not yet n1ade a deal \Yith anyone
for his interest in the property; and that he n1ight 1uake
a deal vvith someone else other than Colmnbia on his
interest in the property. They do not state the total
sale price or the an1ount that ~foreton had already agreed
to take.
(10) The entire negotiations and the entire effort
exerted h~T l\1oreton in the sale of the propert:~, according
to Moreton hin1.self, consisted of a thirty -fiYe "Tord conversation \\rherein l\Iathesius stated that there ,Yere about
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1,550,000 tons of ore in the property .and that he would
pay for the property at the rate of twenty-five cents a
ton, or a total sum of $387,500 for the entire property.
Moreton replied that that was satisfactory to him.
(11) Moreton cancelled the escrow that had been
arranged for. An escrow would have revealed the total
price being p.aid for the property.
(12) Moreton rejected Mathesius' documents which
recited the total purchase price and in.sisted upon Mathesius submitting separate offers of sale and separate closing documents.
(13) 11oreton himself, admits that he never told
the co-o\vners what the total selling price was or what
his family's share of the selling price was going to be.
jioreton has admitted repeatedly that he never, at
any time, ever exercised any of the options he allegedly
or purportedly had obtained from the co-owners.
(1-±) The property vvas not sold, leased or otherwise disposed of on a tonnage basis. Therefore, Moreton
was not entitled to receive all over $100,000. Even if the
property had been disposed of on a tonnage basis the
agreement of ownership being unfair and inequitable and
having been secured as a result of lvforeton's fraudulent
concealment, }loreton was not entitled to receive anything
under it and should now return that which he has unlawfully received.
(15) The deal was closed in Moreton's office Dec.
20, 1948. The co-owners had no lawyer other than Moreton representing them. Columbia was represented by Mr.
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Heald. According to both Rex and his mother, Mrs. Clara
Holland, nothing whatsoever was said or done at that
meeting which would give them notice that Columbia was
paying $387,500.00 for the entire property. The co-owners
assumed that Columbia was paying about $133,333 for
the entire property. No revenue stamps were even visible
during the meeting.
(16) Canfield, a total stranger to Rex, told him that
there were three and one-half million tons of ore in the
property and ore was being offered for twenty-five cents
per ton; Rex then wrote his letter of Sept. 14th to Mathesius. Shortly thereafter it developed that Canfield had
been completely mistaken about the size of the ore body
in the M&H Claims.
(17) Therefore, Rex concluded that since Canfield
w.as obviously mistaken about the a1n01tnt of ore in their
property, he was also probably mistaken about its price.
(18) There was no reason for Rex, or anyone else
for that matter, to believe that on September 14, 19±8,
Canfield knew or had any Yray of finding out "\Yhether
l\ioreton and Mathesius had agreed upon .a price or "-hat
that price was.
(19) Moreton ad1nitted, first "-hen his deposition
was taken in 1953 and later at the trial, price "\vas not
agreed upon or even discussed until about October 15,
1948, or one month after Rex had spoken to Canfield.
(20) The conversation that caused Rex to \Vrite the
letter of Septernber 1-!, 1948, to l\iathesius took place
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about a month before Mathesius and Moreton had agreed
upon or even discussed the price.
(21) There were actually only two people who
would know what the price was when it was agreed upon,
~1oreton and l\1athesius. Rex wrote to M.athesius who
took the letter to Moreton. Neither Moreton nor Mathesius answered or ever referred to the letter.
(22) The letter of September 14, 1948, from Rex to
}fathesius, was written three months before the transaction was closed. It, of course, has absolutely nothing
whatever to do with the running of the statute of limitations. The effect of this letter had dissipated itself and
the confidence of the co-owners in Moreton was restored.
The co-owners continued to follow Moreton's advice .and
accept his statements and sign whatever he presented
to them. The confidence of the co-owners was continuing. They proceeded with the sale. They were then defrauded on December 20, 1948, when they received $33,333.33 for one-fourth and Moreton received $287,500.00.
Nothing occurred after that date which should have
caused them to make further inquiry, or give them notice
of any concealment, misrepresentation or overreaching
until October, 1951. Therefore, the statute of limitation
did not begin to run until the discovery of the fraud, towit: until October 1951.
(23) The Holland family employed Moreton to act
as attorney for the John Holland Estate again in 1949
and Moreton was attorney of record for John llolland's
Estate up until the summer of 1953.
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(24) The co-owners did not discover the fraud that
Moreton had perpetrated upon them for the following
reasons : (a) they obviously had tremendous confidence
in Moreton, witnesseth the fact that they apparently went
along with everything that 1Ioreton asked for, including
the fact that they signed everything that he asked them to
sign; (b) the nature of the property v1as such that there
was absolutely no way of determining \vhat its value \Ya~
let alone determining what price Columbia \vould pay for
it because .apparently standing by itself it \Vas too small
to have any value at all. In other words, it \vould not pay
for anyone to install a facility to work a mine of that size;
(c) actually, that mine \v.as valuable only to one person
and that was Columbia. Had Columbia refused to buy
the mine, it vvould have had no value \\~hatsoever; (d) it
vvas a total stranger at the time, Canfield, who apparently
stated to Rex that the property of the co-owners contained three and one-half million tons of ore and ore \\~as
being offered for 25 cents a ton; (e) actually, Holland
was not required to act .at all upon the statement of a
stranger in preference to the staten1ents pre\iously n1ade
to him by his trusted adviser, ~Ioreton.
( 25) :Th[oreton overreached the co-o\vners. He \vas
unfair to then1. His agreen1ents \Yith then1 \vere inequitable. He never 1nade a full disclosure to then1 of e\erything he kne\v regarding the property. He led then1 to
believe the property \\T.as bringing only $133,333.33 or n
littl,e 1nore. He concealed the price that ("iolu1nbia had, on
or about Oct. 10, 1948, agreed to pay for tht:• entire property.
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(26) However, the co-owners suffered no actual
loss until the deal was closed on Dec. 20, 1948. That is
the date upon which their c.ause of action accrued. Nothing
at all happened thereafter until October 1951 that would
tell them that the total sale price had been $387,500.00.
In the meantime, Moreton was acting as attorney for the
John Holland Estate and continued to act in such confidential relationship, at least until the time this action
was filed.
(27) When Rex heard in October 1951 that Colunlbia had paid .a total price of $387,500.00 he wrote to
~1oreton asking for his proper share. Moreton answered
(Ex. P -25, letter of Dec. 18, 1951). He refused to give the
eo-owners the amount they had coming from him. 1foreton even threatened to put Rex in jail if Rex pushed the
inquiry any further (Ex. P -25).
As quoted in Omega Investment Co. v. Woolley, 72
Utah 474, 271 Pac. 797:

"Such people should not find encouragement
in the thought that, by keeping their machinations
within the letter of the law, they n1ay find sanction
for their practices and reap the reward of their
craftiness. To the victim it is of little import
whether his property is taken from him by a bold
and forcible robbery or by an ingenious and unsuspected deception. The injury to him is the
same; and the evil effect of court decisions which
permit the wrongdoer to enjoy the fruits of his
chicanery is of no small import when viewed 'in
the light of public policy.'"
It is respectfully submitted that this Court should
therefore:
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1. Enter final judgment in favor of the plaintiff Rex
Holland .and against Moreton and his family in the sum
of $95,833.00, plus interest at 6% from December 20, 1948
to the lOth day of July, 1957, plus interest on that entire
amount at 8% per annum from July 10, 1957.
2. Enter final judgment in favor of Rex Holland
as Administrator of the Estate of John Holland, deceased, again.st Moreton and his family in the identic.al
amount, or, in the alternative, to order a new trial for
Rex Holland as Administrator of the Estate of John
Holland, deceased, based upon the trial court's erroneous
direction of a verdict.
Earnestly and sincerely urging all of the foregoing
this brief is
Respectfully submitted,
RAWLINGs, WALLAcE, RoBERTs
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